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THE “COLONIZATION” OF
EAST GERMANY?: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF GERMAN PRIVATIZATION
HEATHER M. STACK
INTRODUCTION
Privatization is a global phenomenon.1 For many developing
countries, and countries formerly controlled by the Soviet Union,
privatization represents the key to prosperity.2 The recent trans-
formation of the East German3 economy is perhaps the paradigm
of this trend; the largest privatization to date, it is viewed as the
most successful of its kind.4 Indeed, most commentators view the
1. At the beginning of the 1990’s at least 83 countries were undergoing some form
of privatization. See Anna Gelpern & Malcolm Harrison, Ideology, Practice, and Perfor-
mance in Privatization: A Case Study of Argentina, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 240, 240 (1992);
see also Mary M. Shirley, Privatization and Performance, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 669, 671–73 (1994) (describing the great increase in privatizations in the 1990’s). In
this Note, privatization refers to the transfer of state-owned enterprises into the private
sector.
2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUD-
IES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116–117, 163 (1992) (noting that improving efficiency
and stimulating development have been the goals of privatization in Jamaica and Sri Lan-
ka); Shirley, supra note 1, at 672 (citing the wish to make a country’s economy and citi-
zens “better off” as the major reason for privatizing); Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why,
and How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23, S25–27
(1992) (setting forth enhanced efficiency and improved use of public resources as reasons
for privatizing).
3. Throughout this Note, the terms “East Germany” and “East Germans” are used
to refer to the territory and citizens of the former German Democratic Republic both
before and after reunification.
4. See, e.g., James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider’s Look into the Regulation of Insider
Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking and Market Reform in Finanzplan
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (stating that post-unification
Germany has reasserted itself as an economic power); Alexander Reus, Eastern Germany
Report: Investment Incentives in the New Länder, 4 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 1, 2–3, 6–7
(1994) (noting that the former German Democratic Republic’s climate, market size, cen-
tral position within Europe, and privatization incentive programs have indeed resulted in
“high investment levels in Eastern Germany”); Edward Mortimer, The Ballot Box Is Here
to Stay, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 1167853, at *7 (“German unity
can already be proclaimed an irreversible success.”); Privatizations Are Deemed Success in
Eastern Germany, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 25, 1993, available in 1993 WL-WSJE
2038759, at *1 (reporting view that most East German companies were privatized success-
fully); John Hall Udo Ludwig, East Germany’s Transitional Economy, CHALLENGE, Sept.
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East German privatization as a model—a “triumph of the mar-
ket”5—to be emulated worldwide.6
By traditional measures, the transformation in Germany has
been a success. Gross domestic product (GDP) is at a respectable
level,7 the formerly state-owned enterprises of the German Demo-
cratic Republic have been transferred into private hands,8 and
reunified Germany is once again a relatively prosperous nation.
However, a complete evaluation of the German program’s success
should account for the difference in benefits enjoyed by East and
West Germans. Six years after reunification, there remains a “deep
economic and emotional divide between east and west.”9 The
East German people still do not trust their new democratic gov-
ernment.10 They are also generally insecure in their land owner-
ship, are much more likely to be unemployed than they were
under the communist regime, and lack ownership in the formerly
state-owned enterprises that have been transferred into private
1, 1994, available in 1994 WL13169674, at *26 (observing that the privatization of East
German enterprises “can be considered successful because of its rapidity and com-
pleteness.”).
5. John Eisenhammer, Germans Pay a Price for Freedom Fire Sale, INDEPENDENT
(London), Jan. 8, 1995, at 7.
6. By 1995, German officials were already acting as consultants on privatization for
about thirty countries around the world. See Mary Williams Walsh, National Agenda:
Going Private—the Profit and the Pain, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at H1. See also supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
7. Although Germany’s GDP fell in 1992 and early 1993, it has rebounded, evi-
dence of a strong recovery after the first years of reunification and following an unrelat-
ed worldwide recession. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVEL-
OPMENT (OECD) ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1994–1995: GERMANY 1, 3, 5. In 1994, Germany’s
GDP rose by 2.9 percent, with 9.2 percent of the increase coming from the growth in
East Germany. Institutes See 3 per cent Rise in German GDP this Year, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, April 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp File.
8. By the end of 1994, almost all of the East German enterprises earmarked for
privatization were owned by the private sector. See Ellen Hasenkamp, German Privatiza-
tion Agency Ceases Work, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1994, at 9; Walsh, supra
note 6, at H1.
9. Matt Marshall, E. Germans Shut Out in Estate Deals; Privatization Halted for
Review by Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at A32; cf. Alan Cowell, It’s Young vs.
Old in Germany as the Welfare State Fades, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at A1 (describing
relationship between East and West as “divided still by what some call a spiritual and
mental version of the Berlin Wall”).
10. See, e.g., Erik Kirschbaum, East Is East and West Is West, but Will the Twain
Ever Meet?, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 1996, at A8 (explaining that the citizens of East Ber-
lin and of the new eastern state of Brandenburg, largely because of mistrust for the
government and frustration over reunification, defeated a referendum to unite Berlin with
Brandenburg).
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hands.11 For East Germans, privatization has created a mistrust
of government, a withdrawal from economic matters, and a gener-
al social divide between citizens of the East and West. The East
Germans’ position has led some commentators to label the trans-
formation a “colonization”12 or “occupation”13 of East Germany.
Collectively, these problems reflect the larger challenge of
achieving long-term economic and political integration in a reunit-
ed Germany, made more difficult by “fairly widespread . . . mal-
aise” across East Germany.14 This discontent continues to fuel
political and social instability today. While it is unlikely to under-
cut markets and democracy in Germany,15 it should serve as a
warning sign for other Eastern European countries and developing
nations who are now privatizing.16 The German experience has
been quite successful for many, but the goal of long-term integra-
tion has suffered, largely because of the legal structures chosen to
implement privatization. These structures did not focus sufficient
attention on the distributional consequences of privatization.
While the German privatization process has been successful in
many aspects, its architects could have employed different legal
structures which would have better served the important goals of
long-term integration and political stability.17 The three most sa-
lient shortcomings of the German privatization process are at their
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Thomas A. Baylis, Transforming the East German Economy: Shock Without
Therapy, in FROM BUNDESREPUBLIK TO DEUTSCHLAND 77, 86 (Michael G. Huelshoff et
al. eds., 1993); see also Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9.
13. DAN VAN DER VAT, FREEDOM WAS NEVER LIKE THIS 9 (1991).
14. Herbert L. Bernstein, Germany’s Unification and its Discontents, DUKE L. MAG.,
Winter 1995, at 4, 5.
15. East Germany had the distinct advantage (or disadvantage) of reunification with
a democratic nation that had a strong market economy. Because of its marriage to a
stable western country, democracy and the economy have not been in serious danger.
Other countries in Eastern Europe coping with the collapse of the Soviet Empire have
been left to conduct the transformations in their societies without a western counterpart.
While Germany is unique in this regard, the German experience may nonetheless be of
value to countries undergoing a unitary privatization. See infra Part III.
16. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 262–84 (1995)
(arguing that the privatizing nations of the world are in danger of reverting to national-
ization in response to ethnic and economic problems associated with privatization).
17. German privatization, of course, was conducted at a time of great political and
social turmoil in Germany and throughout Europe. This Note is written with the benefit
of hindsight; the Germans deserve credit for completing a revolutionary task with relative
success.
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heart distributional: high unemployment in the East, the nature of
restitution, and the lack of East German ownership in the newly
privatized enterprises. Examining these shortcomings can provide
valuable lessons for today’s privatizers.
This Note seeks to distill useful lessons from the successes
and shortcomings of German privatization. To do this, it evaluates
German privatization from a comparative perspective. While no
other nation faces Germany’s unique circumstances, comparison is
valuable because all privatizations, in essence, involve the transfer
of ownership of land and enterprises from public to private hands.
This Note examines privatization processes that have been under-
taken in two very different contexts. The first involves the voucher
privatization and strict restitution policies implemented in the
former Czechoslovakia. By instituting these policies, the govern-
ment of the Czech Republic has more fully integrated its citizens
into its new economy, resulting in a stable democracy and an
economy fully supported by its citizens. The second involves pri-
vatization efforts in Latin America and Southeast Asia. The prob-
lems faced by Latin American and Southeast Asian nations today
demonstrate the dangers of failing to treat distribution and inte-
gration as primary objectives of privatization. An examination of
the privatization process in these regions demonstrates a central
lesson: the distributional consequences of privatization should be
given primary attention.
Part I of this Note discusses the history and the legal struc-
ture of reunification and privatization in Germany. Part II exam-
ines the consequences of German privatization and offers a cri-
tique of the German process, paying particular attention to its
distributional effects and its effects on political integration. Part III
explores comparative alternatives to the German approach, focus-
ing first on the Czech model and then analyzing the results of
privatization in Latin America and Southeast Asia. This Note con-
cludes that, in order to produce stable market economies through
privatization, distributional consequences of the process deserve
priority.
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I. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF GERMAN PRIVATIZATION
AND REUNIFICATION
A. Political and Economic Unification
In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was divided into
two countries: the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the
east and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the west.
The Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, completed the division of the
two Germanies. The Wall symbolized more than just physical
separation; it represented political nonrecognition, economic isola-
tion, and cultural division between the East and the West. After
forty-five years of bitter division, the opening of the Berlin Wall
and the East German border on November 9, 1989, was a shock
to the world.18
Just as surprising was the almost immediate reunification of
the two Germanies. The government of the FRG and the newly
elected democratic government of the GDR19 both wanted to
proceed quickly with reunification.20 In a process that could only
be described as “shock therapy,”21 German leaders seized the
opportunity created by the fall of Communism to make extraordi-
nary changes, and the two Germanies were politically and eco-
nomically unified in one swift motion.
Political reunification took place on October 3, 1990, pursuant
to Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny.22 Under Article 23, the decision to reunify was a unilateral
18. For a good account of pre-unification German history, see generally HENRY
ASHBY TURNER, JR., THE TWO GERMANIES SINCE 1945 (1987) (detailing the postwar
histories of East and West Germany), and for an interesting discussion of the period
surrounding reunification, see PHILIP ZELIKOW & CONDOLEEZA RICE, GERMANY UNI-
FIED AND EUROPE TRANSFORMED (1995) (examining the events of reunification in con-
nection with the political climate in Europe and the former Soviet Union).
19. On March 18, 1990, the first democratic elections took place in the former GDR.
The East Germans elected a democratic government; the Christian Democrats (CDU),
the conservative party of FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and its allies gained a majority.
See Manfred Kuechler, Political Attitudes and Behavior in Germany: The Making of a
Democratic Society, in FROM BUNDESREPUBLIK TO DEUTSCHLAND, supra note 12, at 33,
45–46.
20. See WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE, DER VERTRAG [THE TREATY] 140 (1991).
21. Baylis, supra note 12, at 77.
22. See GG art. 23 (“The Basic Law applies to the lands of Baden, Bayern, Bremen,
West Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz,
Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern [the lands of the
FRG in 1949]. In the remaining parts of Germany, a vote is required in order to adopt
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act by the GDR. The Treaty of Unification23 incorporated the
negotiated terms of reunification and affected the mass transfer of
the FRG’s laws into East German territory.24 Political reunifica-
tion was completed with the broad transfer of laws and the acces-
sion of the GDR to the FRG.
While political unification was completed in a few quick
steps,25 the economic changes that culminated in the mass privat-
ization of East German enterprises involved a more complicated
social and legal reorganization. The process of economic unifica-
tion began with the signing of the Treaty on the Monetary, Eco-
nomic and Social Union on May 18, 1990.26 This Treaty formally
the Basic Law.”) (author’s translation). The Grundgesetz was the law of the land in the
Federal Republic during the time that the two Germanies were separated. A constitu-
tional assembly named the FRG governing document Grundgesetz instead of Verfassung
(constitution) because it wanted to preserve the concept of a Verfassung for the time that
Germany was once again unified. See MARSHALL DILL, JR., GERMANY, A MODERN
HISTORY 441 (1961).
23. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutchen
Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands
(Einigungsvertrag), v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II S.889), translated in 30 I.L.M. 463 (1991) [here-
inafter Unification Treaty].
24. The mass transfer of West German laws to the former GDR began with the
enactment on June 21, 1990 of the Law on the Introduction of Legal Norms of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany in the German Democratic Republic. Gesetz über die
Inkraftsetzung von Rechtsvorschriften der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik, v. 25.6.1990 (GBl. I S.357). See also Norbert Horn, The Law-
ful German Revolution: Privatization and Market Economy in a Re-unified Germany, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 725, 728 (1991). Not all of West Germany’s laws were transferred im-
mediately; some required a more gradual transition. For example, housing rents were
raised gradually and the civil service system was transferred slowly. See id. at 729.
25. In October of 1990, Germany was reunified, as the German Democratic Republic
acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany. See GG art. 23. The territory of the for-
mer GDR has been divided into five Länder (states) and has been incorporated into the
FRG and its federalist system through the process of accession. The five new federal
Länder, which encompass all of the former GDR, are Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen. See Unification Treaty art. 3–4, v.
28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.890), 29 I.L.M. at 464–65. The territory of East Berlin has been
integrated into a state with West Berlin. Berlin itself is presently a state completely sur-
rounded by the state of Brandenburg. A 1996 vote defeated a referendum to combine
Berlin and Brandenburg into a single state, so their future status remains unclear. See
Kirschbaum, supra note 10, at A8.
26. Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
v. 25.6.1990 (BGBl. II S.537), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1120 (1990) [hereinafter Monetary
Treaty]. The treaty was passed by the People’s Chamber on June 21, 1990. See Horn,
supra note 24, at 728. The GDR constitution was an obstacle to speedy unification be-
cause it embraced a centrally planned economy and socialist property rights; implementing
the Monetary Treaty therefore required changes to the GDR constitution. See id. at 727.
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created a market economy for the East,27 one which would
“operate on principles of private ownership and competition driv-
en by free pricing and the free movement of labor, capital, goods,
and services.”28 This allowed the two Germanies to function un-
der the same economic system.29 The Monetary Treaty also uni-
fied the currency of the GDR and FRG. The West German Mark
(D-Mark) became the currency of both lands while the East Ger-
man currency was invalidated.30 During a legislatively-mandated
transition period, East Germans could convert their currency into
D-Marks at very generous rates.31 Currency union and the cre-
ation of a market economy provided an economic environment in
East Germany that allowed privatization to move forward.
For example, provisions of the GDR Civil Code restricted the free transfer and circula-
tion of most property. See Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] CIVIL CODE §§ 17–19 (G.D.R.) (re-
pealed in 1990). To facilitate the Monetary Treaty, the East German Parliament, in June,
1990, adopted new “Constitutional Principles” making constitutional the principles of pri-
vate ownership. See Gesetz zur Änderung und Ergänzung der Verfassung der DDR (Ver-
fassungsgrundsätze), v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I S.299) [hereinafter Constitutional Principles]. The
Constitutional Principles also altered the GDR Constitution’s amendment process so that
future changes could be made more easily. Constitutional Principles, supra, at 300. The
mass transfer of FRG laws into East Germany also facilitated the process. See SCHÄUBLE,
supra note 20, at 177–78; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. Monetary Treaty art. 1(3), v. 25.6.1990 (BGBl. II at S.537), 29 I.L.M. at 1121.
The program of Social Market Economy, a system in which social and economic goals
co-exist, is embodied in the Guidelines to the Monetary Treaty, along with the main
market principles to be implemented in the GDR. See Gemeinsames Protokoll über
Leitsätze, v. 29.6.1990 (BGBl. II S.545), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1146, (1990). See Horn,
supra note 24, at 730–31.
28. Ranier Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 809, 818 (1994) (citing Monetary Treaty art. 1(3)). Decades
earlier, a controversy existed over whether or not the Constitution of West Germany
favored one economic system over another. The Federal Constitutional Court decided
that the Constitution was neutral as to an economic system. See BVerfGE 4, 7 (17);
BVerfGE 50, 290 (336). This decision allowed the Constitutional Court to avoid questions
of economic policy. Rather, the decision allowed the policy makers to decide such issues
and choose policies which they felt would best facilitate transition.
29. The economic union precipitated the need for funding in the East. The Deutsche
Einheit (German Unity) fund, through which massive transfers from West to East oc-
curred, was created to serve that need. See SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 177.
30. Monetary Treaty art. 10(5), v. 25.6.1990 (BGBl. II at S.538–39), 29 I.L.M. at
1126.
31. East German currency was exchangeable for D-Marks at a rate of one-to-one for
basics such as wages, grants, pensions, rents, leases and personal savings. The basic cur-
rency exchange rate for some other transactions was two-to-one. See id.; HORST SIEBERT,
DAS WAGNIS DER EINHEIT 21–23 (1993) (explaining the rash decision to exchange the
currency and pointing out the warning signs that were ignored from the beginning).
These exchange rates were very generous. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 80.
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B. Privatization
The formal process of political and economic reunification
fundamentally altered the East German constitutional and legal
framework, but the massive privatization process, as the corner-
stone of the plan to integrate the GDR into a market economy,
ultimately had the most far-reaching effects on the East German
people. Like the other steps in reunification, the privatization pro-
gram was conceived and implemented rapidly. Political leaders in
both East and West chose to privatize East Germany completely
in one step, eschewing a more gradual approach.32 Privatization
involved both the sale of formerly state-owned property through
the government’s trust agency (the Treuhand) and the restitution
of expropriated property to its rightful owners.
1. Sale of Property. The transformation to a private property
system was initiated by the GDR’s enactment of the Treuhand-
gesetz (Trust Law).33 The law created the Treuhandanstalt (Treu-
hand), or trust agency, to conduct privatization in East Ger-
many.34 The first words of the Trust Law declared emphatically
that privatization was to occur “as quickly and as comprehensively
as possible.”35 The Treuhand was to assume ownership of all
state-owned enterprises and to privatize them by sale to
investors.36
The transfer of ownership to the Treuhand began on July 1,
1990, the date of the Monetary Treaty. On that day, all socialist
entities in East Germany became companies under German corpo-
32. See Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermögens
(Treuhandgesetz), v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I S.300) [hereinafter Trust Law]. Some commentators
have labeled the German approach the “Big Bang” approach; this approach is designed
to have an immediate impact on the economy by transferring all state-owned enterprises
to private hands as quickly as possible. See, e.g., Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice:
China’s Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 97, 99
(1995) (describing the “Big Bang” approach as the radical “shock therapy” form of pri-
vatization); Tamar Frankel, Foreword, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 295, 307 (1995) (describing the
“Big Bang” approach to privatization as “drastic measures designed to have a strong
immediate impact”).
33. Trust Law, v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I at S.300).
34. The Treuhand was created by the GDR prior to reunification and was integrated
into the government of the Federal Republic in the Treaty on Unification, where it be-
came a federal agency overseen by the minister of finance. Unification Treaty art. 25, v.
28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.897), 30 I.L.M. at 481.
35. Trust Law, v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I at S.300) (author’s translation).
36. See id. at S.302.
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rate law.37 The Treuhand, in turn, became the owner of all of the
shares of these companies and became responsible for preparing
them for sale to the private sector.38 The Treuhand was required
by law to evaluate the economic positions of these companies; it
determined which of the former socialist enterprises were com-
petitive enough to be privatized, which should be dismantled, and
which should be liquidated.39 It was also required to evaluate
prospective investors to ensure that their investment was real,
would fit in with the structure of the newly reunited Germany,
and would help to create jobs.40 Only then was the Treuhand au-
thorized to sell shares and interests in the companies.41
The sale of the companies was the most important part of the
privatization process. Before the Treuhand could sell interests in
the formerly state-owned enterprises, it first needed reliable valua-
tions of them. The Financial Statement Law required enterprises
considered for privatization to prepare financial statements using
D-Mark valuations.42 The Law also enacted measures which in-
cluded an infusion of money from the Treuhand and the balancing
of healthy companies with unhealthy companies to spread the little
available wealth. Despite these capitalization efforts, enterprises
being considered for privatization usually remained in debt. If the
prospects for survival were questionable, the Treuhand decided
against privatization and liquidated the company.43 If, however,
the company’s prospects for survival were promising, the Treuhand
would fund the company up to the amount of its debt.44 The
company would then be prepared for direct sale into the private
sector.
The Treuhand was initially charged with the privatization of
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at S.301–02. The liquidated companies provided some of the capital need-
ed in the transition.
40. See Martin E. Elling, Privatization in Germany: A Model For Legal and Function-
al Analysis, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 581, 627–31 (1992).
41. See Trust Law, v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I at S.300–01).
42. See Besondere Bestimmungen für Fortgeltendes Recht der Deutschen Demokrat-
ischen Republik, ch. III, § 1(2), v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II S.1173) [hereinafter Financial
Statement Law]. Prior to this law, there were no reliable valuations of the state-owned
enterprises, but with implementation of the Financial Statement Law, the poor financial
condition of most of the enterprises became apparent. See Horn, supra note 24, at 739.
43. See Elling, supra note 40, at 627–28; Horn, supra note 24, at 739.
44. See Horn, supra note 24, at 739.
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about 8000 firms with 40,000 plants.45 To begin the privatization
process, an interested investor submitted a plan of investment.46
Among the factors the Treuhand considered in evaluating these
plans were the number of jobs created or maintained by the pro-
posal, the “type of investment promised, the willingness and ability
to remove past environmental damage, and the overall dependabil-
ity and reputability of the bidder.”47 Based on this evaluation,
the Treuhand decided whether or not to sell the firm to the pro-
spective investor.48
Early in the process, interested investors often approached the
Treuhand with proposals to buy. Later in the process, however,
the Treuhand was forced to become more aggressive, eventually
establishing offices in New York and Tokyo to facilitate the solici-
tation of willing investors.49 As fewer willing investors were
found, the Treuhand often was forced to sell at very low prices, or
to close many East German companies for which no buyer could
be found.50 In seeking to maximize the economic viability of pri-
vatized industries, then, the Treuhand was forced to liquidate
many East German companies,51 and, consequently, many East
German jobs.
Although neutral on its face, in application the Trust Law
favored foreign and West German investors over East Germans.52
Generally, the Treuhand favored these investors because they had
better access to capital than East Germans.53 Often, in fact, even
45. See HORST SIEBERT, GERMAN UNIFICATION: THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 18
(The Kiel Inst. of World Econ. Working Paper No. 468, 1991). After the Treuhand dis-
mantled and liquidated some firms, it was left with about 12,000 enterprises. See
Romanus Otte & Wolfgang Bunse, A Gigantic Task with Mammoth Costs: German Unifi-
cation, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
46. See Trust Law § 9, v. 22.6.1990 (GBl. I S.302). For an in-depth explanation of
the process that the Treuhand went through with each prospective investor before decid-
ing whether or not to approve the application, see Fritz K. Koehler, Investment in the
New German Federal States, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 495, 528–531 (1992).
47. Elling, supra note 40, at 630.
48. See id. at 630–31.
49. See id. at 628.
50. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 92.
51. See supra notes 38–41.
52. No discrete provisions were enacted in the Trust Law to encourage East German
participation in privatization or in gaining ownership in the privatized enterprises. East
Germany did have some form of participation because the governments of the new feder-
al Länder were involved in the governance of the Treuhand. See Trust Law § 4, v.
22.6.1990 (GBl. I at S.301).
53. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 97. Because Germany was unified, the prospects
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\STACK.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:43am
1997] PRIVATIZATION IN REUNIFIED GERMANY 1221
when East Germans did possess the capital necessary to investor,
more “capable” foreign investors were favored.54 East German
needs were thus subordinated in both the Trust Law’s operation
and effect.
2. Restitution. The other mechanism for privatization, resti-
tution,55 was based on the principle that property expropriated by
the socialist state should be returned to its former owners.56
Wolfgang Schäuble, FRG Minister of the Interior, explained why
restitution was an important issue in reunification negotiations: “It
was and remains a giant task, to overcome and remedy the
violations of rights of the past forty-five years, so that in the
present and the future there is not great suffering from the losses,
and so that old injustices do not become new injustices.”57 In
theory then, restitution sought to achieve a degree of parity
between historic injustices and current economic needs.
In practice, restitution was a very complicated issue, due to
the long history of East German expropriations and the divided
views on the manner in which restitution should occur. German
privatizers were forced to account for two different periods of
expropriations in the history of the GDR and to decide if one or
both of these eras would be the subject of the restitution poli-
cies.58 The first wave of expropriations, from 1945 to 1949, was
carried out by Soviet authorities after World War II.59 These ex-
propriations were intended to serve both as punishment to the
for investors in East Germany appeared much more promising than did the investments
in other eastern European privatizing countries. This allowed more foreign money to
come into East Germany. See id. At the same time, however, it had a detrimental effect
on East Germans, as it prevented them from investing in the newly-privatized industries.
See infra notes 157–66 and accompanying text.
54. See Marshall, supra note 9, at A32.
55. Restitution describes the process of returning land that was expropriated by the
government of the GDR between 1945 and 1989 to its former owners. The FRG insisted
on restitution-in-kind, as opposed to monetary compensation, as the cornerstone of this
privatization mechanism. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. For an in-depth
discussion of property rights in Germany, and restitution in particular, see generally
Jessica Heslop & Joel Roberto, Property Rights in the Unified Germany: A Constitutional,
Comparative, and International Legal Analysis, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 243 (1993).
56. See Frank, supra note 28, at 830–31.
57. SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 260 (author’s translation).
58. For a thorough explanation of the history of East German expropriations, see
Elling, supra note 40, at 590–95.
59. See Frank, supra note 28, at 812–14. The government of the GDR did not come
into existence until 1949, so it was not involved in this wave of expropriations.
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Nazis and as a foundation for the establishment of a communist
system of property.60 The Soviet expropriations were widespread
and were not accompanied by any form of compensation.61
The second wave of expropriations occurred after 1949, when
the government of the GDR was created and formal Soviet con-
trol of the region ended.62 The GDR did not systematically ex-
propriate firms as the Soviets had done; instead, the GDR took
over particular businesses by applying economic pressure to force
businesses into bankruptcy.63 It applied similar pressure to land-
owners who owed money to the government. Finally, the GDR
confiscated property through criminal sentencing and other regula-
tory means.64
In addition to deciding which expropriation victims would be
eligible for restitution, the privatizers also had to determine how
to structure the compensation of former property owners. That is,
the privatizers either could conduct restitution through direct mon-
etary compensation or could implement a system of restitution-in-
kind, which would entail returning the land rights to former own-
ers; on this issue, East and West German opinion differed. The
East Germans opposed restitution-in-kind because it would force
many people in East Germany off their land and possibly out of
the homes they had occupied for the last forty-five years.65 The
East Germans were particularly opposed to restitution of the land
taken by the Soviets between 1945–1949 because much of that
land was agricultural, was used in state farms, and was, at the
time of reunification, held mainly by East Germans.66 The West
Germans, however, insisted on restitution-in-kind for two main
reasons.67 First, the FRG made a constitutional argument based
on the takings principle in the Grundgesetz.68 The second and
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. While formal Soviet control ended for the most part in 1949, in some areas
Soviet control did not disappear completely until 1954. See DILL, supra note 22, at 44.
63. See FRANK, supra note 28, at 814.
64. See id. at 815. Indeed, the GDR continued to expropriate property years later,
by passing laws forming agricultural and trade collectives. See id.
65. See SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 254–55, 258–259.
66. See id. at 260.
67. Many of the West Germans favored restitution-in-kind for the land expropriated
by the Soviets as well. See id. at 259–60.
68. See GG art. 14. While negotiators from the West defended this argument, in re-
ality it was never given much credence. See SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 259–60.
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more crucial reason that the West Germans favored restitution-in-
kind was that they did not want the FRG to pay for the large
claims that would likely result under a monetary compensation
scheme.69 It was estimated that the compensation claims for all
expropriated lands would amount to approximately eight billion D-
Marks (approximately six billion U.S. dollars), a sum too large for
the FRG.70
The Joint Declaration of June 15, 1990 embodies the compro-
mise that was reached on both issues.71 The Joint Declaration,
which contains the principles of restitution, formed the basis of the
law regulating all restitution claims, the Law on the Regulation of
Open Questions of Property (Property Law).72 Under the Proper-
ty Law, only land that was expropriated by the GDR after 1949
was eligible for restitution.73 Restitution-in-kind was selected as
the method for compensation; the rightful owner of property was
entitled to recover it.74 A few exceptions were provided for prop-
erty held by good faith purchasers, property used for housing
units, property dedicated to the public interest, and property
where a joint commercial enterprise on the property would be
69. See SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 256, 258–59.
70. See id. at 256. It is important to note, however, that the West Germans have
since paid about six hundred billion dollars (about nine hundred billion D-Marks) in
connection with reunification, making the concern over eight billion D-Marks here seem
minuscule. See infra note 150. It seems odd that such a relatively small sum would be
rejected in favor of restitution-in-kind when it would have saved many East Germans
from fighting to stay on the land they had occupied for forty-five years.
71. The Joint Declaration was originally adopted by the governments of the FRG
and GDR on June 15, 1990. The text was later included in the Unification Treaty. See
Unification Treaty art. 41, v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.1119), 30 I.L.M. at 496.
72. Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen, v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II S.1159)
[hereinafter Property Law]. The right of restitution is now protected under article 14 of
the Grundgesetz, the private property clause. GG art. 14. See also Elling, supra note 40,
at 604–05.
73. Restitution was specifically incorporated into article 143 of the Grundgesetz by
the Unification Treaty. See Unification Treaty art. 4, v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at 891), 29
I.L.M. at 466. Excluding property expropriated between 1945–49 from the restitution
scheme was a contested constitutional issue. The Federal Constitutional Court of Ger-
many held that the method did not contravene the Grundgesetz because the expropria-
tions prior to 1949 were conducted by the Soviets and not the GDR. See BVerfGE 84,
90 (128–32). However, a final law on restitution, which was passed in 1995, allows victims
of expropriations by the Soviet regime in the period 1945–1949 to purchase their proper-
ty at current market value or receive a portion of the property itself as compensation.
See Nomi Morris, No Man’s Land; Across Central Europe, Millions of Victims Reclaim
their Property, MACLEAN’S, Sept. 25, 1995, at 24.
74. See Frank, supra note 28, at 832 & n.157.
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adversely affected.75 The rightful owners were usually awarded
monetary compensation for property falling under one of these
exceptions.76
The Property Law’s procedures made restitution a slow pro-
cess. The Property Law required people claiming to be rightful
owners of expropriated property to submit applications for their
claims to certain government offices.77 Once a restitution claim
was filed on a piece of property, that property could not be a part
of any transaction until the claim was investigated and a decision
rendered.78 Therefore, if a current holder, including the Treu-
hand, wanted to sell or lease property which was subject to an
outstanding restitution claim, no action could be taken until a
decision was rendered—which usually took months and often took
years.79
The German government also enacted the Investment Law,
which worked in conjunction with the Property Law by providing
exceptions to the principle of restitution.80 The Law created “a
preference for the current holder of real estate over any prior
holder if the real estate is required: ‘to ensure or create employ-
ment . . . ;’ ‘to meet significant housing needs;’ or ‘to develop the
infrastructure required’ for either of the first two activities.”81
Holders of such property could qualify for priority over restitution
claimants by presenting to the local administration for examination
and approval a plan outlining the potential investment plans for
the property.82 Once the plan was approved, the property was
certified as sound for investment purposes and was removed from
75. See Property Law § 3, v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.1160); see also Elling, supra
note 40, at 607.
76. See Property Law §§ 4–5, v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.1160); see also Elling, supra
note 40, at 607.
77. The deadlines for applications for restitution of expropriated property were Octo-
ber 13, 1990 and March 31, 1991. See Verordnung über die Anmeldung
vermögensrechtlicher Ansprüche, v. 11.10.1990 (BGBl. I S.2162 (S.2164)).
78. See id. at S.2164.
79. See Morris, supra note 73, at 24; see also Frank, supra note 28, at 831.
80. Gesetz über besondere Investitionen in der Deutschen Demokratishcen Republik,
v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II S.1157) [hereinafter Investment Law].
81. Frank, supra note 28, at 835 (citing Investment Law §§ 1(2)(a)-(c)); see Michael
Gruson & Georg F. Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former German Demo-
cratic Republic: A Change of Direction, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS
1992, at 455, 462 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 635
(1992)).
82. See Frank, supra note 28, at 835 (citing Investment Law, § 1(3)).
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the purview of possible restitution claims.83 The rightful owner of
the property would then receive monetary compensation instead of
restitution-in-kind.84
Despite the exceptions to the Property Law embodied in the
Investment Law, the possibility that former owners would assert
claims against property that was to be privatized inevitably slowed
investment in the new federal states.85 Restitution claims threat-
ened to preempt investment as conflicts ensued between former
owners and current holders of property. The federal government
responded by amending the Property Law and the Investment Law
with the Law on the Removal of Impediments to Privatization and
the Promotion of Investment (Impediments Removal Law).86 The
Impediments Removal Law was passed to ease the danger of
investment preemption by restitution claims and to correct the
weaknesses of the Property Law and the Investment Law.87
The Impediments Removal Law focused on improving the
status of investors by favoring them over restitution claimants.88
The law favored investment over restitution by creating further
exceptions to the Property Law.89 It expanded the exceptions in
the Investment Law which were “too narrowly defined and restric-
tive.”90 For example, governmental entities including the Treu-
hand could sell or lease property encumbered by a restitution
claim, so long as the new sale was made for certain “investment
purposes.”91 Additionally, a third party investor was favored over
83. See Investment Law § 2(1), v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.1158).
84. See Investment Law § 3(4), v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II at S.1158).
85. See Frank, supra note 28, at 831, 840–47; see generally Gruson & Thoma, supra
note 81, at 455.
86. Gesetz zur Beseitigung von Hemmnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen
und zur Förderung von Investitionen, v. 28.3.1991 (BGBl. I S.766) [hereinafter Impedi-
ments Removal Law]. The amended version of the Property Law can be found at Gesetz
zur Regulung offener Vermögensfragen (Vermögensgesetz), v. 26.4.1991 (BGBl. I S.958)
[hereinafter Amended Property Law]. The amended version of the Investment Law can
be found at Gesetz über besondere Investitionen in dem Aritkel 3 des Einigungsvertrages
genannten Gebiet (Investitionsgesetz), v.26.4.1991 (BGBl. I S.995) [hereinafter Amended
Investment Law]. The Investment Law was repealed in 1992. See Elling, supra note 40,
at 614; see also Frank, supra note 28, at 841–42. See also Gruson & Thoma, supra note
81, at 459–76 (providing an analysis of the Impediments Removal Law and its effect on
investments in the former GDR).
87. See Gruson & Thoma, supra note 81, at 457.
88. See Frank, supra note 28, at 843.
89. See Elling, supra note 40, at 611–12.
90. Frank, supra note 28, at 841.
91. Gruson & Thoma, supra note 81, at 462. These investment purposes are similar
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a restitution claimant if the third party was a “more capable”
investor.92 Moreover, property holders could commence invest-
ment if the plans satisfied the special purposes defined in the
Investment Law.93 In these circumstances, the restitution claimant
could recover monetary compensation.94 Thus, in many instances,
the law favored a current property holder over a restitution claim-
ant. Finally, the Impediments Removal Law also contained provi-
sions designed to speed up the resolution of restitution claims.95
Even though the Impediments Removal Law diluted the prin-
ciple of restitution in order to promote investment, the results did
not meet the German government’s expectations. In early 1992, an
estimated one hundred billion D-Marks in investment capital was
still blocked by restitution claims.96 In response, in July of 1992,
the government again amended the Property Law with the Invest-
ment Priority Law.97 The Investment Priority Law embodied the
concept of “investment before restitution.”98 Final deadlines for
restitution claims were imposed and once they had passed, all
titles to real estate were deemed unencumbered.99 These proce-
dural rules added an element of finality to the restitution process,
which helped to insure the security of investments. In the Invest-
ment Priority Law, the “investment purposes” exceptions100 also
were broadened to give more investors the opportunity to preempt
to the exceptions embodied in the Investment Law. See supra notes 75–76 and accompa-
nying text.
92. See Frank, supra note 28, at 844; Amended Property Law § 3(6)-(7), v.26.4.1991
(BGBl. I at S.959–60).
93. See Amended Property Law § 3(6)-(7), v. 26.4.1991 (BGBl. I at S.959–60); supra
text accompanying notes 83–84.
94. See Amended Property Law § 3(6)-(7), v. 26.4.1991 (BGBl. I at S.959–60).
95. See Frank, supra note 28, at 844–45, 847; Amended Property Law §6(a), v.
26.4.1991 (BGBl. I at S.963–64).
96. See Frank, supra note 28, at 861. Using the current (January 1997) exchange rate
of 1.66 D-Marks to one U.S. dollar, this is equivalent to approximately sixty-seven billion
dollars.
97. The Investment Priority Law is contained in Article 6 of the Second Property
Law Amendment. Gesetz zur Änderung des Vermögensgesetzes und anderer Vorschriften
(Zweites Vermögensrechtsänderungsgesetz) art. 6, v. 21.7.1992 (BGBl. I S.1257 (S.1268))
(replacing the Amended Investment Law with the Investment Priority Law) [hereinafter
Investment Priority Law].
98. Investment Priority Law §§ 3, 4, v. 21.7.92 (BGBl. I at S.1269).
99. See id.; see also Frank, supra note 28, at 861. Unfiled claims became void and
were forfeited, see id., whereas under the previous Property Law they did not. See
Amended Property Law § 3, v. 26.4.1991 (BGBl. I at S.959).
100. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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restitution claims.101 Even after this legislation, however, by late
1992 unresolved restitution claims numbered over two million.102
II. RESULTS OF PRIVATIZATION
On December 31, 1994, the Treuhand officially closed its
doors and the mass privatization effort in Germany came to an
end.103 The effort, by many measures, was a success. When the
Treuhand closed, it had transferred almost all of its enterprises to
the private sector. The Treuhand sold 6500 companies to private
investors, reprivatized 1600, sold 300 to local communities, and
shut down about 3700.104 By December 31, 1994 only sixty com-
panies remained unsold.105 Nearly half of the companies the
Treuhand gained ownership of in 1990 are still in business today
as private entities.106
Traditional economic measures, like the growth rate and GDP
of East Germany, also indicate the Treuhand’s success. With an
annual growth rate that reached over nine percent in late 1995,
East Germany has become one of the most quickly expanding
regions in Eastern Europe.107 Over the last five years, the per
capita GDP of East Germany has increased from thirty percent of
the per capita GDP in the West to fifty percent.108 While GDP
for all of Germany fluctuated from 1990 to 1995,109 it is expected
to have grown one percent in 1996 and two percent in 1997.110
This growth rate appears low; however, since West Germany ab-
sorbed the dilapidated state economy of the East, such numbers
are viewed by most as evidence of success.111
Indeed, given the tumultuous and difficult political context in
which the German project took place—the collapse of Eastern
Europe and a worldwide recession—the economic numbers are
101. See Investment Priority Law §§ 3, 4, v. 21.7.92 (BGBl. I at S.1259).
102. See Frank, supra note 28, at 862.
103. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 36.
104. See Otte & Bunse, supra note 45.
105. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 7.
106. See Walsh, supra note 6, at 1.
107. See Otte & Bunse, supra note 45.
108. See id.
109. See supra note 7; Hilfe Country Report, Germany, Janet Matthews Info. Serv.
(Sept. 1996), available in LEXIS, World Library, Profil File.
110. See Hilfe Country Report, supra note 109.
111. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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impressive. Political pressure was immense, and the Germans were
confronted with previously unencountered mass privatization and
reunification. West Germany transferred an enormous amount of
funds to the East and constructed a legal regime which success-
fully privatized and incorporated an entire economy. In the face of
these challenges, the relatively smooth transition is remarkable.
This success, however, has not been without social and eco-
nomic costs. While privatizers abstractly recognized the turmoil the
East German people would face throughout the transition and
made limited attempts to smooth the process, a number of con-
crete problems remain. These problems collectively concern the
long-term integration of East German society into the new Germa-
ny. As one commentator has stated:
[T]he unification of the two German states had . . . far-reaching
consequences for the former GDR and its citizens. The sudden
dissolution of a state with its social and economic order, together
with the attempt to bring about a fast and comprehensive reorga-
nization of important social functions based largely on the west-
ern model [left] . . . every individual citizen . . . confronted with
the changes in cultural and political values induced by the unifi-
cation process, or with reorienting and adapting his or her behav-
ior to these changes.112
Sociological studies have suggested that “East Germans lack the
life skills and strategic thinking needed to build careers, establish
firms, or just make a decent living in a highly individualized soci-
ety.”113 The lack of preparation and instruction for entry into a
market economy has left East Germans uninformed about and un-
involved in their new economy.114
East Germans, in turn, have reacted to privatization with
112. Detlef Landua, The Social Aspects of German Unification, in THE ECONOMICS OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION 92, 92 (A. Ghane Ghaussy & Wolf Schäfer eds., 1993).
113. Feiwel Kupferberg, Managing an Unmasterable Past, SOCIETY, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at
69, 71.
114. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 81; Kupferberg, supra note 113, at 71. Many East
Germans did not understand how their new economy functioned. For example, one East
German car company possessed back orders for cars (Trabbis, the only car widely-avail-
able in East Germany prior to reunification) for fifteen years under the GDR. After
reunification, however, as other options emerged, no one wanted to buy them. The
company’s leaders did not realize that they should stop manufacturing because there was
no demand for their product. East German businesses were simply not prepared for the
entirely new way of thinking and functioning. See Yuri Shpakov, How She Sold the
GDR: Interview with Birgit Breuel, MOSCOW NEWS, June 24, 1994, at 23.
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feelings of disbelief and betrayal. Many East Germans believe that
the Treuhand sold off property as quickly as it could, paying little
attention to the effect it would have on life in East Germany.115
In surveys conducted in 1990, East Germans were markedly less
satisfied than West Germans with their quality of life.116 Begin-
ning in 1991, monthly surveys tracked the massive discontent in
East Germany,117 as seventy to eighty percent of East Germans
consistently stated that they were unsatisfied with reunification.118
Graffiti on East German walls reads “Verraten und Verkauft”—
“Betrayed and Sold.”119 Playwright Rolf Hochhuth criticized the
Treuhand and its “plundering” of East Germany in his play
“Wessis in Weimar: Scenes from an Occupied Land.”120 The play
delves into the East Germans’ feelings of anger and frustration
caused by the Treuhand’s policies.121
Disillusionment with the transformation process and the uni-
fied government persists,122 as recent election results demon-
strate. In 1994 elections, some East Germans voted for the former
communist party, expressing their dissatisfaction with the new
market system.123 In the 1995 Berlin elections, the Partei des
demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)),
successor to the GDR’s communist party, the Sozialistische
Einheitspartei (Socialist Unity Party (SED)), captured thirty-six
percent of the vote in the eastern half of the city.124 More recent-
115. See Heslop & Roberto, supra note 55, at 293.
116. See Landua, supra note 112, at 99–102.
117. See Keuchler, supra note 19, at 33, 46. For a collection of discussions concerning
the psychological impact of unification on both East and West Germans, see generally
PSYCHOLOGISCHE ASPEKTE DES SOZIO-POLITISCHEN WANDELS IN OSTDEUTSCHLAND
(Gisela Trommsdorff ed., 1993).
118. See Kuechler, supra note 19, at 47.
119. See Heslop & Roberto, supra note 55, at 293.
120. ROLF HOCHHUTH, WESSIS IN WEIMAR: SZENEN AUS EINEM BESETZEN LAND
(1993). The play opened in Berlin in 1993 and was criticized by German politicians as
sanctioning violence against the government and the Treuhand to appease East German
feelings. See Michael Lawton, Well-Schooled in Scandal, TIMES (London), June 10, 1992,
§ 2 (Life & Times), at 5.
121. See generally HOCHHUTH, supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitu-
tional State, in MULTICULTURALISM 107, 147 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (discussing the
“smoldering resentments” of the East Germans in response to reunification and a per-
ceived lack of representation in the politics of the reunited Germany).
123. See Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9.
124. See Mortimer, supra note 4, at 7. The SED, the communist party in the former
GDR, dominated the government. People were forced to become members of the SED
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ly, in 1996 voters in East Berlin and Brandenburg voted not to
join together to become a single state.125 Voters cited their mis-
trust of federal government officials, who they felt had failed to
keep their promises, and the persistent, deep divide between East
and West Germans as reasons for the vote.126 Opinion polls also
demonstrate popular disillusionment. They consistently show that
East Germans are less dedicated to a liberal democratic system,
both politically and as a lifestyle, than are West Germans.127
The slow integration of the two Germanies may be traced to
the privatizers’ failure to focus on the distributional consequences
of privatization. The three most significant problems associated
with German privatization are: high unemployment; the nature of
restitution and its consequences; and the lack of East German
ownership in the newly privatized enterprises. The combination of
these factors has resulted in an economic and social divide be-
tween East and West that threatens the political stability of a
reunified Germany.128
and follow its ideology in order to gain employment or educational opportunities in the
former GDR. See TURNER, supra note 18, at 47.
125. See Kirschbaum, supra note 10, at A8.
126. See id.
127. See Kupferberg, supra note 113, at 70.
128. Some political philosophers have developed theories that account for the general
“social well-being” concerns highlighted in East German privatization. Professor Cass
Sunstein has suggested that democratic governments should measure social well-being as
well as GDP in determining the success of government policies because “[a] high priority
for those thinking about the role of the state should be to develop methods for focusing
attention on things that matter to people’s lives.” Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994). Sunstein’s definition of social well-being
includes factors such as life expectancy, educational opportunities, access to political pow-
er, self-respect, the availability of social goods, see id. at 1309–10, access to health servic-
es and safe water, the number of radios and televisions in a country, the nature of rela-
tions with other people in the local community, see id. at 1321–23, “housing, security of
life and property (including freedom from crime), availability of recreational and cultural
resources, employment, income and wealth, and political participation.” Id. at 1322.
John Rawls similarly suggests that an adequate measure of well-being also include
measures of “a. basic rights and liberties . . . ; b. freedom of movement and free choice
of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; c. powers and prerogatives
of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the
basic structure; d. income and wealth; and finally, e. the social bases of self-respect.”
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 181 (1993).
Germans Walter Eucken and Ludwig Erhard proposed similar theories decades ago.
See Alan Peacock & Hans Willgerodt, German Liberalism and Economic Revival, in
GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 1, 1–10 (Alan Pea-
cock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989). These theories inhere in the idea of a social market
economy. For an in-depth look at the German social market economy, see generally
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A. Unemployment
The East Germans have had to contend with the seemingly
intractable problem of unemployment.129 At the time of reunifi-
cation, 9.7 million people were employed in the former GDR; by
1994, the number had fallen to 6.2 million.130 Nearly half of the
working age population in East Germany was put out of work in
the transition,131 burdening the Treuhand with the label “Job
Killer Number One.”132 Not even one-third of East German em-
ployees retained the jobs they possessed at reunification by early
1995.133 The unemployment picture remains bleak, as the 1995
unemployment rate in East Germany was 13 percent.134 In the
East German town of Dessau in October, 1996, the unemployment
rate was 20.1 percent, excluding those who had been given early
retirement and those who were participating in government train-
ing programs.135 In Germany as a whole the unemployment rate
in 1995 was 9.4 percent and was expected to rise to 10.3 percent
GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION, supra. While a
complex theoretical framework in which to evaluate privatization decisions is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is significant that such a theory may provide a better or, at least,
alternative way in which to measure the success of a project such as mass privatization.
129. Critics point out that the situation previously in the GDR was one of
“overemployment.” See Landua, supra note 112, at 93–94. While critics suggest that com-
munist overemployment made unemployment a necessity in the transformation to a mar-
ket economy, that attitude fails to acknowledge the psychological and social effects that
result from unemployment—a fortiori the unexpected overnight unemployment associated
with East German political upheaval.
130. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 7. While unemployment was a difficulty for
many, others suffered the fate of shortened working hours. See Reus, supra note 4, at 21.
The figures for unemployment do not include numbers for those whose working hours
have been reduced.
131. See Walsh, supra note 6, at 1.
132. Ramesh Jaura, Germany-Economy: Crucial Privatization Agency Gets Mixed Re-
action, Inter Press Serv. (Jan. 5, 1995), available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
133. See id.
134. See Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9. This 13% unemployment rate does not indi-
cate the true number of people out of work. In East Germany, many people, mostly
women who were fully employed under communism, have dropped off the unemployment
register and are now receiving welfare. Also, many people are in job creation schemes
and are actually not working. These schemes are beginning to be cut for lack of funds,
and the people in these job creation schemes are not counted in the unemployment
statistics. See Judy Dempsey, No Work, Little to Believe in: Popular Pressure for Politi-
cians to Find Solutions to East German Unemployment, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at 17.
135. See Alan Cowell, Kohl is an Iron Man, But the Price is High, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1996, at A1.
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in 1996.136 The German Confederation of Trade Unions predicts
that in the year 2000 there still will be one million jobless people
in East Germany and that the employment level will remain below
that of 1992 until at least 2003.137
Unemployment in East Germany was caused mainly by two
aspects of the unification process:138 the implementation of a cur-
rency union under the Monetary Treaty and the privatization un-
dertaken by the Treuhand. When the currency union took place in
1990,139 East Germany suddenly was thrown into competition
“virtually unprotected, . . . with one of the most efficient and
technologically advanced western economies [West Germany’s]—as
well as with the economies of the Federal Republic’s partners in
the European Union, Japan, and other wealthy capitalist
states.”140 East German workers’ wages rose quickly, increasing
by fifty-three percent from reunification to 1994, thus eliminating
the competitive advantage possessed by East Germany in cheaper
labor.141 The result of exchanging East German Marks and D-
Marks at a 1:1 ratio was that the price of East German enterprises
rose by about 400 percent, making investment much less at-
tractive.142 This overvaluation of the East German Mark had di-
136. See Hilfe Country Report, Germany, supra note 109.
137. See Jaura, supra note 132.
138. Of course, unemployment was an inevitable result of the shift from a socialist
economy to a market economy. Nonetheless, the methods the German privatizers used to
prepare the citizens for this massive unemployment were inadequate. See infra notes
146–50 and accompanying text. While a European recession was occurring at the same
time as privatization and high unemployment was common throughout western Europe,
East Germany was unique in that its unemployment rate jumped from full employment
in 1989–90, under socialism, to massive unemployment the following year. See supra notes
129–37 and accompanying text.
139. Politics affected decisions about currency unification. As East Germans witnessed
what was available in the West they applied election pressure to Kohl and his govern-
ment. See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 6. Two other reasons for the currency union were
to stop migration from eastern to western Germany and to facilitate the unification pro-
cess. See Horn, supra note 24, at 733. The German government had attempted to use
currency union to help the East Germans, but it was a disaster for the economy. East
Germans were completely unprepared for the ensuing unemployment. See Baylis, supra
note 12, at 81.
140. Baylis, supra note 12, at 80; see also VINCENT EDWARDS & PETER LAWRENCE,
MANAGEMENT CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY 1, 3 (1994) (outlining various economic diffi-
culties suffered by the former GDR following currency union).
141. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 7; SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 126–27. While
the wages that East Germans were receiving under the Communist regime sufficed for
consumption in the GDR, once more expensive western goods were available, the East
Germans demanded higher wages to compensate. See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 6.
142. See Shpakov, supra note 114, at 23 (reporting interview with Birgit Breuel, Presi-
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sastrous effects on the East German economy. As wages in East
Germany increased to account for the overvaluation, East German
companies were forced to demand higher prices. Higher prices
then led to decreased trade; trade with eastern European coun-
tries, formerly East Germany’s largest trading partners, declined
dramatically.143 In 1991, productivity in the East was thirty per-
cent of that in the West.144 Climbing wages, combined with de-
creased productivity, led to the high levels of unemployment.145
Unemployment is especially problematic because East Ger-
mans were unprepared for the massive displacement that followed
reunification. Before 1990, East Germany had little experience
with unemployment; under the former socialist regime, full em-
ployment was the priority, even if it meant inefficiency.146 Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl promised the East Germans “blossoming land-
scapes” with reunification, and failed to warn them of the hard
times to come.147 Predictions in the Treuhand’s early days were
that privatization would end with “the agency’s coffers overflowing
with profits.”148 The politicians shared these optimistic predictions
with the German people, making matters worse by failing to pre-
pare them for the difficulties associated with the reunification pro-
cess.149 Instead of ending its process with “overflowing coffers,”
however, the Treuhand lost about 200 billion dollars in its five
years of existence, money which German taxpayers will have to
repay.150 The next generation will be paying to rebuild East Ger-
dent of the Treuhand). Another commentator has estimated that the price rose even
more—by 500%. Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9.
143. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 83.
144. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 40.
145. See id. at 128. See also Klaus-Dieter Schmidt & Birgit Sander, Wages, Productivi-
ty and Employment in Eastern Germany, in THE ECONOMICS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION,
supra note 112, at 60–65 (arguing that more modest growth of wages would have helped
to preserve old jobs at least in the short term). This unemployment cannot be blamed
solely on the German government. East German workers, labor unions and some East
German managers demanded higher wages and kept productivity low, contributing to the
problem of unemployment. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 125.
146. See Landua, supra note 112, at 93–94; see also Baylis, supra note 12, at 81.
147. Cowell, supra note 131, at A1; see also Kupferberg, supra note 116, at 75 (ex-
plaining that East Germans’ “lack of familiarity with democratic politics” led them to
“firmly believe the promises of Chancellor Kohl”).
148. Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 36.
149. See Cowell, supra note 135, at A1.
150. See Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9. More money from West Germany was not
the answer either, as the west more than generously subsidized the privatization process.
West Germany transferred over 400 billion dollars to East Germany in the first 5 years
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many well into the future, as a debt of 340 billion D-Marks from
the former GDR still exists. As of September, 1995, West Germa-
ny still transferred more than five percent of its GNP to East Ger-
many.151
East Germans blamed the Treuhand for their problems.152
For them, “[t]he Treuhand became a symbol of the brute force of
capitalism.”153 The Institute for Labor Market Research pub-
lished a study emphasizing the “enormous adjustment burdens”
faced by unemployed East Germans.154 East Germans would
rather work than receive federal money, but jobs have been un-
available since privatization.155 The inevitable psychological dam-
age from the transition only makes long-term social integration
more difficult.156
Second, unemployment was caused by the privatization process
itself. The Monetary Treaty and the currency union caused a
shock to the economy and made the Treuhand’s task even more
difficult. The goal of the government was to privatize as quickly as
possible.157 The Treuhand, in facing the task of privatization, dis-
after reunification. See Otte & Bunse, supra note 45, at *4. The total was 600 billion
dollars by the fall of 1996, leaving West Germans with higher tax burdens equally unsat-
isfied. See Cowell, supra note 135, at A1. Early estimates for payments through the Deut-
sche Einheit fund were greatly underrated which only fueled the discontent among West
Germans. See SCHÄUBLE, supra note 20, at 178–79. See also SIEBERT, supra note 31, at
146–73.
151. See Otte & Bunse, supra note 45, at *3. These transfers to East Germany will
not end any time in the near future. One agency estimated that such transfers will re-
main a “serious drain” on public finances in Germany for at least the next fifteen years.
Hilfe Country Report, Germany, supra note 109, at *17. See generally Wilhelm Bleek, Der
Umbruch in der DDR und wir in der Bundesrepublik, in EINE DEUTSCHE REVOLUTION
60, 60–79 (Gert Joachim Glaeßner ed., 1991) (explaining the social issues and difficulties
faced by the West Germans in adjusting to unification).
152. Detlev Rohwedder, the first head of the Treuhand, was assassinated in 1991 by
the Red Army Faction. The Red Army Faction is a radical group in Germany that pro-
tested the treatment of East Germans by the unified German government, especially by
the Treuhand. See Koehler, supra note 46, at 514–515 n.77 (explaining the Red Army
Faction’s criticism and protest of Treuhand). The Red Army Faction began in the 1960s
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The group grew out of the student protest move-
ment in the political aftermath of World War II. See JOANNE WRIGHT, TERRORIST PRO-
PAGANDA 23–27 (1990). The Red Army Faction, which calls itself a “communist revolu-
tionary group working to overthrow the West German state,” uses violence and propa-
ganda to further its cause. See id. at xii-xiii.
153. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 36.
154. Jaura, supra note 132.
155. See Dempsey, supra note 134, at 17.
156. See id.
157. See Trust Law, v. 22.6.1990 (BGBl. I S.300); see also supra note 35 and accom-
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assembled many enterprises and cut out the overemployment typi-
cal of the communist system, which led to high unemployment
rates and disenchantment with the new market system.158 Low
levels of investment often forced the Treuhand to attract investors
by selling property below market value, by assuming debts and
operating losses of the enterprises it was attempting to privatize,
and by paying for environmental cleanup.159 Much of this activity
led to further unemployment.160 In the first few years of privat-
ization, industrial production in the former GDR fell by two-
thirds, causing unemployment.161 In short, the Treuhand “caused
excessive economic dislocation for eastern Germans.”162
Although it was necessary to eliminate overemployment, the
speed with which privatization occurred, combined with the lack of
preparation, created massive economic dislocation. The dramatic
increase in wage levels caused by the currency union necessitated
unemployment because businesses found the new wages unafford-
able.163 A better strategy would have been “to subsidise unneces-
sary jobs temporarily [rather] than to support large numbers of
unemployed in east Germany.”164 The generous unemployment
compensation provided by post-unification Germany could alterna-
tively have been utilized to subsidize wages;165 easing people out
of employment more gradually would have allowed more time for
adjustment. Also, warning the East Germans in advance would
have helped them to prepare.
panying text.
158. See, e.g., Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9; Kupferberg, supra note 113, at 75–77.
159. See Eisenhammer, supra note 5, at 7.
160. See id.; see also SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 102 (explaining that because the
Treuhand had no information and no market to measure the value of the enterprises, it
was often forced to take what it could get for the enterprises, which usually meant sell-
ing them very cheaply). See Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing high level of
unemployment, which is surprising to those who had become accustomed to Communist
guarantees of employment for life); VAN DER VAT, supra note 13, at 258 (stating that
Treuhand “rationalized . . . jobs out of existence in order to rid itself of otherwise
unsaleable assets”).
161. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 83.
162. Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 9.
163. See Schmidt & Sander, supra note 145, at 66.
164. Dempsey, supra note 134, at 17.
165. See Schmidt & Sander, supra note 145, at 66–71.
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B. The Nature of Restitution
As of September, 1995, of the 2.7 million restitution claims
that had been filed, only about one-third had been decided.166
The process chosen for restitution, which favored restitution-in-
kind, was criticized from the outset because of the fact that it
would discourage investment.167 As a result of compensating res-
titution claimants in kind, even with the multitude of pro-invest-
ment laws enacted by the German government, restitution has
remained a slow and painful process.168 As one restitution claim-
ant stated, “[t]he Wall is gone, but the victims remain.”169 The
backlog of restitution claims still causes complaints among the
population and is a serious problem facing the German polity
today.170 If Germany had chosen to provide restitution by mone-
tary compensation, rather than in kind, many of today’s problems
could have been avoided.171
The nature of the chosen restitution policies—often pitting
claimants from the West against current holders of property from
the East—has only increased animosity between West and East
Germany. Restitution-in-kind, by definition, transferred ownership
of East German property out of the hands of East Germans and
into those of former owners, who were usually either foreigners or,
more often, West Germans.172 This process naturally caused re-
sentment on the part of East Germans towards their Western
counterparts, further exacerbating the sense of division between
East and West. A policy which favored monetary compensation
could have avoided much of the hostility inherent in the restitution
process: direct monetary restitution would have compensated the
former owners for the injustices they suffered, but would have
allowed physical possession and ownership of the property and
enterprises to remain in the hands of East German citizens. How-
ever, the process of restitution-in-kind has only emphasized the
166. See Morris, supra note 73, at 24.
167. See Horn, supra note 24, at 742–43.
168. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 65–66 (questioning whether restitution was the
proper principle to follow in privatization); see also supra notes 96–102 and accompanying
text.
169. Morris, supra note 73, at 24.
170. See id.
171. For discussion of the Czech system of restitution, see infra notes 198-208 and ac-
companying text.
172. See Morris, supra note 73, at 24; infra notes 174-76, 180 and accompanying text.
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differences between East and West Germans and has become
another roadblock to true integration.
C. Lack of Ownership
East Germans have been left with very little ownership in
what was their country.173 Throughout the process of transferring
ownership of state-owned enterprises into private hands, the
Treuhand concentrated its sales efforts on West Germans and
foreigners.174 Very few East Germans had the capital to partici-
pate in the privatization process, so the Treuhand sought out as
many foreign and West German investors as possible in order to
retain Germany’s place in the world market.175 East Germans
were often rejected as investors even if they possessed the capital
to invest. The Treuhand rejected their offers by saying the plans
were “economically backward” compared to Western, “forward-
looking” plans.176 West Germans and foreigners were also fav-
ored because East Germans were not trusted to make intelligent
and profitable investments.177 As a result, East Germans were
left largely with no ownership in their country. As Otto Schilly, a
federal parliament member, said,
The problem is that Treuhand degraded east Germans as objects
rather than subjects of the process. They should have been more
highly integrated. . . . East Germans have lost faith in the trans-
formation process. We forgot that a market economy is also
determined by psychological factors. “Corporate identity” is
173. It is important to note that Germans do not traditionally invest in stocks. See
Can Germans Overcome Their Fear of Equities?, BUS. WK., Oct. 23, 1995, at 16; Michael
R. Sesit & Greg Steinmetz, Telekom Workers to Reap Stock Windfall, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 1995, at C1. However, this is not directly relevant to the East German situation. It is
West Germans who have traditionally not held stock; the East Germans, who lived in a
socialist economy, have not had the opportunity to own stock for the last 45 years. By
recognizing the differences between East and West Germans in this way, perhaps the
East Germans could become more involved, or at least have a stake in their economy
with some form of ownership. Beyond stock ownership, however, the companies that
were sold were sold almost exclusively to private parties, and most of those parties were
West Germans or foreigners, not East Germans. See Shpakov, supra notes 114, at 23.
174. See Shpakov, supra note 114, at 23 (describing the Treuhand’s desire for foreign
investors and investors familiar with “modern management techniques” and capable of
providing “production . . . technologies.”).
175. See id.
176. Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 11.
177. See Marshall, supra note 9, at A32.
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something that is now missing in east Germany.178
So much investment in the East came from West Germany that,
today, “eastern Germany is quite literally becoming an economic
colony of West German capital.”179
The privatization process set up by the German privatizers
excluded East Germans from participation; a “colony” of West
Germany has resulted. East Germans have no stake in their econ-
omy; many do not understand how it works and have become
bitter about outsiders’ participation in the privatization process. As
one commentator stated:
The most disturbing effect of . . . [privatization] is the bitter
feeling on the part of many eastern Germans that their once-na-
tional property has been sold off to outsiders—to western Ger-
mans, mostly—and that the easterners who kept the economy
plodding along all those difficult years under communism didn’t
have the wherewithal to enter the bidding fray.180
This exclusion has contributed to the general discontent exhibited
in East Germany which, in turn, has led to political turmoil and a
low level of commitment to the market economy. Jobs have disap-
peared, the East Germans have virtually no ownership in their
former country, and because the East Germans were not prepared
for the shock of a new economic system, the morale and attitudes
of the people are almost beyond repair.181 Critics say that the
psychological scars displayed by the East Germans are “so
deep . . . that they have put the east into a worse position—for all
its newfound economic potential—than Eastern Europe’s other
former Communist states.”182
The enormous task of creating true political, social, and eco-
nomic integration of the two Germanies required a structurally
different privatization process.183 Policymakers today can learn
178. Hasenkamp, supra note 8, at 11.
179. Baylis, supra note 12, at 86. See also Edmund L. Andrews, Bonn’s Bank Buys
Hollow Economy, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1997, at A1. Not only is East Germany becom-
ing an economic colony, but it has similarities to a political colony as well. Even in east-
ern Germany, West Germans occupy most of the high political positions. See Detlef
Schubert, Between Gain in Prosperity and Loss of Competence: Reflections on the Social
and Political Situation of the East German People after German Unification, in GERMAN
MONITOR, RE-ASSESSING THE GDR 31, 38–45 (J.H. Reid ed., 1994).
180. Walsh, supra note 6, at 1.
181. See Dempsey, supra note 134, at 17.
182. Walsh, supra note 6, at 1.
183. See Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, Vorwort, in EINE DEUTSCHE REVOLUTION, supra
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from the successes and failures of the German privatization pro-
gram, from its failure to focus on the distributional consequences
of privatization and the resulting lag in achieving the goal of long-
term integration, as well as by comparing German privatization to
alternative methods.
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION
Alternative methods of privatization may help fill in the gaps
in the German privatization model and guide today’s privatizers to
methods better tailored to fit their needs. Germany’s post-privat-
ization problems should serve as warning signs to today’s
privatizers to avoid similar results; privatization will be successful
only where people accept, understand, and participate in the re-
sulting market economy and where political stability thereby re-
mains. While every country is unique and no comparison will be
exact, every privatization involves the same fundamental process:
the transfer of ownership from the state to private hands. This
discussion will focus on privatizations in two very different con-
texts, which together highlight the most important deficiencies in
the German model: the former Czechoslovakia, on the one hand;
and Latin America and Southeast Asia, on the other. While les-
sons from the Czechoslovak privatization program involve what
was done right in that effort, the lessons from Southeast Asia and
Latin America involve what was done wrong.
note 151, at 5, 7–8.
The reunification of the two German states also meant that two German societ-
ies, which were completely different from one another, with completely different
individual and collective experiences, who knew almost nothing about the other,
were forced into one society. . . . Fundamental differences in social characteris-
tics existed which cannot be assimilated to one another by laws or with the
help of the German National Bank. . . . The walls of stone and cement have
fallen, but the walls in the heads of the people still remain.
Id. at 5, 7 (author’s translation).
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A. The Former Czechoslovakia
The former Czechoslovakia,184 like East Germany, undertook
a program of simultaneous democratization and mass privatization
in the early 1990s. At the beginning of the privatization process,
the Czechoslovak economy was technically backward and suffered
from a low rate of productivity.185 Like the East German econo-
my, it was dominated by state-owned enterprises, which accounted
for ninety-eight percent of Czechoslovakia’s GDP.186 But Czecho-
slovakia was forced to conduct privatization through different
mechanisms than Germany,187 and as a result, it successfully tran-
sformed its economy and government while avoiding the “colonial
mentality” that has developed in East Germany.188 The legal
structure of privatization in the Czechoslovakia better served the
goal of involving its citizens in the new economy by providing
them with opportunities for influence and participation in that
economy. This Note focuses on three aspects of Czechoslovak
privatization: preparation, restitution, and direct sales and voucher
privatization.
184. Czechoslovakia had been a unified country since 1918, when the Czech Republic
and Slovakia were combined as a single federation. The distinct cultures and economies
of the two co-existed for decades, but privatization and a transition to democracy com-
plicated this co-existence; on January 1, 1993, the federation broke up and the Czech
Republic and Slovakia were reformed. Currently, the Czech Republic continues the pri-
vatization process begun under the Czechoslovakian federation. Although a comprehensive
study of privatization in the former Czechoslovakia is beyond the scope of this Note, the
privatization which began in a unified Czechoslovakia is relevant: the characteristics most
salient to the German model will be the focus here. For an in-depth analysis of Czech
privatization, see, for example, ROMAN FRYDMAN, ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE 40–95 (1993); Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization
Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 84 (1993); Anna
Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A Comparison,
14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 315 (1993).
185. See Michael Mejstrˇík & Milan Sojka, Privatization and Regulatory Change: The
Case of Czechoslovakia, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE 66,
66 (Michael Moran & Tony Prosser eds., 1994) (describing Czechoslovakia’s economic
crisis).
186. See id. at 68.
187. See id. Because Czechoslovakia was not absorbed into a rich western country, it
was forced to conduct privatization in a manner which required citizen participation and
little capital, because its citizens possessed little, with supplements from foreign invest-
ment. See id.
188. Walsh, supra note 6, at 1.
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1. Preparation. The first important lesson from Czechoslo-
vakia is that “rhetoric and reality must strike a balance.”189 The
citizens of the Czechoslovakia were warned in advance that
privatization would be a difficult process.190 The citizens seem to
have accepted that and complained little about the economic diffi-
culties.191 Because Czechoslovak leaders warned citizens in the
beginning that the transformation would be difficult, the citizens
have been pleasantly surprised.192 By maintaining realistic expec-
tations, the Czechoslovak government helped its citizens to prepare
psychologically for the massive transformation to come. These
warnings allowed citizens of Czechoslovakia to retain “a psych-
ological advantage over East German[s].”193
The East Germans were led to believe that privatization
would bring immediate prosperity.194 They have received much
greater subsidies than did the citizens of Czechoslovakia, but “their
expectations were raised too high at reunification, leaving disap-
pointment in its wake.”195 High expectations are one reason that
unemployment has had such a dispiriting impact on East Germans.
In Czechoslovakia unemployment was expected, but in East Ger-
many it was not. The reality of the situation has bred general dis-
content among East Germans and has begun to lead to political
instability.196 While in Germany there is little danger of the de-
mocracy or economy failing,197 other privatizating nations may be
more susceptible to political and economic instability. Informing
the polity will combat instability.
189. See Susan Greenberg, Czechs get Reform Balance Right; Tempering Rhetoric with
Realism is Proving a Success, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 26, 1994, at 33.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
195. Greenberg, supra note 189, at 33.
196. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.
197. East Germany has a great advantage over most privatizing nations in that it
immediately joined West Germany, a stable democratic country with a market economy.
Because West Germany is such a strong country, the problems which may severely effect
the precarious economic balance in other Eastern European and developing countries will
not likely have the effect on Germany of destroying the market economy or democracy.
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2. Restitution. The Czechoslovak leaders, like their German
counterparts, chose to return property expropriated under
communism to its rightful owners in order establish a base for a
market economy with private property rights.198 Czechoslovakia
passed two restitution laws in the fall of 1990. These laws embody
the Czechoslovak attempt to restore ownership of assets, such as
real estate and enterprises that were taken in the latest wave of
communist expropriations, beginning in 1948.199 The Czech-
oslovak restitution scheme is the largest being carried out in
Eastern Europe, outside of that in the former GDR.200
Czechoslovakia feared that its citizens might encounter the
same problems Germans had faced, such as the slowdown of in-
vestment due to complications in the purchase of land subject to
restitution claims.201 As in Germany, restitution-in-kind was the
preferred form of restitution. When that was impossible, compen-
sation, usually in the form of low-interest bonds, was provided.202
The Czechoslovak privatizers allowed restitution claims only for
property expropriated between February, 1948, and January,
1990.203 Unlike the German scheme, one important aspect of the
Czechoslovak restitution scheme was that only persons residing in
Czechoslovakia were eligible to make restitution claims.204 While
the Germans were practically forced to favor those living outside
of East Germany in their restitution process,205 Czechoslovakia
instituted a system in which citizens of Czechoslovakia were the
primary beneficiaries. Despite political controversy over whether
to expand restitution to persons living beyond the Czechoslovak
border, the government maintained its policy.206 Because the gov-
198. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 76.
199. Id. at 76–77; Mejestrˇík & Sojka, supra note 185, at 69–70.
200. See Jan Mladek, The Different Paths of Privatization: Czechoslovakia 1990 - ?, in
PRIVATIZATION IN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY: STUDIES OF PRECONDI-
TIONS AND POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 121, 126 (John S. Earle et al. eds., 1993).
201. See Mejstrík & Sojka, supra note 185, at 72.
202. See id.
203. See Mladek, supra note 200, at 122.
204. See id.
205. Most of the people living outside East Germany with restitution claims were
once East Germans who either fled the Nazi regime or fled from the communist govern-
ment of the GDR. These people are certainly entitled to compensation for their property,
but perhaps for those outside East Germany, a monetary compensation scheme (which
was rejected early, see supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text) could have preserved
East German ownership while compensating others for their losses.
206. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 77; Mladek, supra note 200, at 125–26;
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ernment maintained a consistent flexible policy which favored its
own citizens, Czechoslovak restitution progressed much more smo-
othly than Germany’s and was the fastest method of privatization
in Czechoslovakia.207
The strategies employed in the Czechoslovak model provide
insights into the German process. Czechoslovakia concentrated on
its citizens, who consequently retained ownership of their property
and were satisfied with the process. Although it would be impossi-
ble to implement the same process in Germany due to political
and constitutional constraints, the principle behind it is useful.208
Czechoslovakia created a system of rules which, while strict, were
flexible enough not to require amendments throughout the process,
as did Germany’s. Citizens of Czechoslovakia were given priority
in the allocation of privatization opportunities. Final deadlines for
claims were diligently enforced and monetary compensation was a
ready alternative to restitution-in-kind from the beginning. Invest-
ment was not slowed and restitution progressed relatively smoothly
in Czechoslovakia.
These strategies should be considered by other privatizers
where restitution is a potential form of transfer. A flexible system
which favors citizens of the country and allows them to maintain
ownership will foster integration and stability. By designating mon-
etary compensation as a preferred or at least equal method for
restitution, privatizers would maintain opportunities for foreign
investment. In Germany, a system of monetary compensation
would have had the dual effect of allowing East German holders
to retain property and of speeding along investment. Future privat-
izers should take note to avoid a similar lack of integration and a
similar inhibition of investment.
3. Direct Sales and Voucher Privatization. The privatizers in
Czechoslovakia, like the German privatizers, chose the “Big Bang”
approach to mass privatization.209 Like German privatization,
Jiri Pehe, The Czech Republic: A Successful Transition, RFE/RL RES. REPS., Jan. 7, 1994,
at 74.
207. See Mejstr´ík & Sojka, supra note 185, at 72.
208. Because Germany is a unified country, it would be unconstitutional to restrict
restitution to those living in East Germany, because as citizens, West Germans would
presumably be included in any restitution scheme. See G.G. art. 14. Also, politically, the
Germans could not deny restitution to people who fled Germany during the Nazi regime.
209. See Jane Perlez, Czechs Move Quickly to Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
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Czechoslovak privatization included privatization by sales to
private persons and restitution of expropriated properties.210
Unlike German privatization, however, the Czechoslovak system
combined a variety of methods which created opportunities for
citizens of Czechoslovakia to take part in the transformation of the
Czechoslovak economy.211 The sales of large state-owned
enterprises were conducted through a flexible combination of
methods, including both direct sales and the voucher privatization
method.212
Citizens of Czechoslovakia were more involved in direct sales
of assets because they were given opportunities to invest. Citizens
paid the book value for enterprises, while foreigners paid market
value.213 As a result, foreigners usually had to pay much more
than citizens for enterprises.214 The decision to differentiate be-
tween citizens and foreigners allowed for more internal investment
in Czechoslovakia. In Germany, on the other hand, foreign and
West German investors were favored, forcing East Germans out of
the picture. The Czechoslovak solution tended to prefer its own
citizens, thus allowing them to maintain ownership in their country
and to avoid a colonization from the outside, as occurred in East
Germany.
Alternatively, Czechoslovakia also used the method of voucher
privatization. The process of voucher privatization, sometimes
referred to as “popularizing privatization,”215 consists of “sales”
of shares of privatizing enterprises to citizens.216 Citizens of
Czechoslovakia paid an administrative fee of about thirty–four
dollars to purchase a booklet of investment coupons, which in turn
could be exchanged for stock in newly privatized enterprises.217
In the first wave of privatization, completed in 1993, more than 8.5
million people “bought” stock.218 Many invested their vouchers
1993, at A8; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
210. See Mejstrík & Sojka, supra note 185, at 68–69.
211. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 185, at 80–81.
212. See Mejstrik & Sojka, supra note 185, at 73; see also FRYDMAN ET. AL, supra
note 184, at 80.
213. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 81.
214. See id.
215. Holger Schmiedling, Alternative Approaches to Privatization: Some Notes on the
Debate, in PRIVATIZATION 95, 106 (Horst Siebert ed., 1992).
216. See id.; FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 84–85.
217. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 84; Philip Crawford, Second Wave of
Offerings Will Liquidate State Control, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 9, 1993, at 7.
218. See Jiri Pehe, Czechoslovakia: Toward Dissolution, RFE/RL RES. REPS., Jan. 1,
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with investment advisors who then created investment funds.219
Voucher privatization allowed citizens to participate in the transi-
tion of the Czechoslovak economy.
Citizens of Czechoslovakia, as a result, were better prepared
for the transition and had more invested in the outcome of the
privatization process. The voucher scheme gave citizens a stake in
the new market economy; in return, citizen entrepreneurs are now
“fiercely loyal to Prague’s democratic government.”220 The
Czechoslovak privatization effort also progressed quickly in spite
of its flexibility. By late 1993, just under two years after the im-
plementation of the Privatization Act, sixty percent of Czech prop-
erty221 was already in private hands.222 Although the full effects
of voucher privatization are still unknown,223 it is clear that the
process has successfully transferred ownership into Czechoslovaki-
a’s own private sector. The Czech Republic claims that, at the end
of 1995, almost eighty percent of its GDP came from the private
sector.224 The Czechoslovak economy is now probably the health-
iest in Eastern Europe.225
1993, at 84, 87.
219. See Mladek, supra note 200, at 131. These investment funds are similar to mutual
funds. The presence of investment funds is vital to the success of a voucher scheme; it
enables persons to diversify their risk. The funds can also direct citizens how to invest
their own money since none of these citizens have ever experienced investing before. See
Schmiedling, supra note 215, at 103–04. If voucher privatization had been employed in
Germany, such funds likely would have been beneficial there as well.
220. Walsh, supra note 6, at 1. See also Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe:
Another Case of Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12 (1995) (“Also, by giving people an individual stake in the pro-
cess, it solidified public support for the privatization campaign.”).
221. This statistic is for the Czech Republic. The Czech government has continued
with the plan instituted by the Federation. See Ron Chepesiuk, The Velvet Divorce, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at 1D. Slovakia halted its adherence to the Czech
privatization model and instead adopted one similar to that used in Germany. See Slovak
Privatisation Halted, CTK NAT’L NEWS WIRE, Dec. 27, 1995, available on LEXIS, World
Library, Curnws File.
222. See Pehe, supra note 206, at 72. With Czechoslovakia, as opposed to Germany,
“private” hands includes the hands of many citizens of Czechoslovakia.
223. Economic consequences of voucher privatization are still questioned by econo-
mists who doubt the economic efficiency and economic consequences of the process. See
Mejstrík & Sojka, supra note 185, at 79–80. While these results are yet to be seen, what
is of interest in this Note is the mechanism of involving the citizens of the privatizing
country as an alternative to direct sale of companies.
224. See Prague Transformed, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 17, 19.
225. See The Czech Republic—An Island of (Relative) Stability in East Europe, SDI
INSTRUMENT BUS. OUTLOOK, Aug. 15, 1995 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
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While voucher privatization was successfully carried out in the
former Czechoslovakia,226 it was considered, but never attempted,
in East Germany. Wolfgang Ullman, an East German leader and
Treuhand insider, wanted to try a voucher scheme which would
have entitled each East German to a share of the country’s as-
sets.227 He believed that if the citizens were given a stake in the
new market economy, then they would have had greater incentives
to help make the new economy succeed.228 The German govern-
ment rejected the suggestion, because a voucher system would only
have brought money to the people with vouchers, and would not
attract foreign investment or technology.229 Even acknowledging
the need for foreign capital, however, a more flexible plan, which
utilized foreign investment but also secured some domestic partici-
pation, would likely have provided better results for the Ger-
mans.230
Politicians and critics of voucher privatization defend the
decision not to use vouchers in East Germany for two principal
reasons: voucher privatization is slower than the German method,
and voucher privatization does not attract foreign capital.231 Fur-
ther, the German decision was defended on the grounds that other
former communist nations needed a system like voucher privatiza-
tion, which distributed ownership to the people, in order to create
a property rights regime. Since such a regime (and an accompany-
ing democracy) already existed in Germany, they argued, no such
method was necessary.232 That attitude—that East Germany was
226. Privatization in general has been more successful in the Czech Republic than in
Slovakia since the breakup of the federation. See Chepesiuk, supra note 221, at 1D.
227. See Walsh, supra note 6, at H1.
228. Id.
229. The German government never acknowledged the fact that foreign investment is
not always good. While the influx of capital from foreign investment is good for the
economic structure, foreign investors do not always “promote the interests of the local
population.” Chua, supra note 16, at 264 n.333.
230. See Mejstrík & Sojka, supra note 183, at 74–80 (acknowledging the risks and
potential problems of voucher privatization, but also recognizing the positive aspect of
giving people ownership in their country); Schmiedling, supra note 197, at 106–07.
231. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 97–98; Schmiedling, supra note 213, at 106–107;
Michal Mejstrik, Where We Are Headed: The Case of Czechoslovakia, in COMRADES GO
PRIVATE 65, 77 (Michael P. Claudon & Tamar L. Gutner eds., 1992). Siebert also cited
protection of East German jobs as a reason for rejecting voucher privatization. See
SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 99. However, the unemployment rate for East Germans with
the chosen method of privatization was great indeed. See supra notes 129–36 and accom-
panying text.
232. See SIEBERT, supra note 31, at 98.
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entirely distinct from other privatizing countries—epitomizes the
problem with the German system. West Germany was a democra-
cy and already had established property rights and a market sys-
tem, but East Germany was not. Consequently, some measures
based upon the experience of Eastern European countries would
have fostered long-term social and economic integration in the
reunified Germany.
Critics acknowledge that East Germans deserve some owner-
ship in their enterprises.233 They claim, however, that this would
have forced the Treuhand essentially to give away enterprises,
which would have disadvantaged East Germans in the long
run.234 They claim that the German model was beneficial because
privatization progressed quickly and attracted ample foreign invest-
ment, which, in turn, strengthened the German economy.235
While in the short term this may be true, East German integration
remains a long-term problem. The apologists recited the rhetoric
of long-term benefits, but the plans actually focused on the short
term. Some short-term efficiency should have been sacrificed in
order to create a more stable democratic and economic order, one
in which the citizens of East Germany could meaningfully partici-
pate.236
A flexible program that included aspects of both the actual
German privatization model and voucher privatization would have
benefitted the people of East Germany.237 If the Treuhand had
reserved some portion of East German firms for distribution to
the East Germans, and sold the remainder to foreign investors, it
would have attracted much-needed capital while also involving
East Germans in the ownership of privatized enterprises. By pre-
233. See id. at 99.
234. See id. at 100–01.
235. See id. at 103–04.
236. See Chua, supra note 16, at 296–97 (“[S]ome or all of the regulations I am pro-
posing will likely be less than optimally efficient from the short-run perspective. . . .
Waiting for the trickle-down is not sound strategy in the developing world.”).
237. Such an alternative privatization model was proposed by Gerlinde and Hans-
Werner Sinn, and is called the “participation model.” See GERLINDE SINN & HANS-
WERNER SINN, JUMPSTART 81–86 (1992). Like the voucher method, this model would
retain some ownership for the East German people. It would have allowed the Treuhand
to retain some small portion of ownership in each of the privatized enterprises, which
would then have been distributed to the citizens of the former GDR. See id. This meth-
od was never attempted by the German government. See also Mejstrík, supra note 231,
at 75–81 (also suggesting a part-voucher, part-foreign investor privatization scheme).
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serving some ownership for the East Germans, the “colonial” men-
tality could have been avoided and integration better fostered.
This is not to suggest that voucher privatization would be without
problems, nor that vouchers would have solved all of Germany’s
current problems. Rather, the point is that the effort by the Czec-
hoslovak government to focus on the distributional consequences
of privatization has helped the Czech Republic avoid larger prob-
lems of integration, and in turn, political and economic instability.
The same type of model would serve the developing world in
conducting large–scale privatizations to create stable democracies
and market economies, into which all the citizens of developing
countries might be more easily integrated.
B. Southeast Asia and Latin America
In the Latin American and Southeast Asian privatization
context, lessons can be learned not from what countries in these
regions have done right, but from what they have done wrong.
Privatizations have been conducted in Latin America and South-
east Asia for decades.238 In Latin America, privatization prob-
lems have arisen because of drastic class differences.239 Similar
issues have arisen in Southeast Asia as a result of ethnic group
division.240 While these developing regions are obviously very dif-
ferent from Germany (even more so than from the countries of
Eastern Europe), important similarities nevertheless exist. Specifi-
cally, just as Latin America and Southeast Asia are comprised of
starkly different social groups, Germany consists of the East and
West Germans.
Professor Amy Chua’s examination of privatization in the
context of group conflict provides some valuable lessons for Ger-
many.241 In The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Be-
238. See Chua, supra note 16, at 227–256 (describing history of privatization and na-
tionalization).
239. See, e.g., FERNANDO H. CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY & DEVEL-
OPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 27 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., 1978) (referring to the
style of political confrontation in crisis situations as well as the shape and functions of
workers unions as illustrations of “class situations”).
240. See Chua, supra note 16, at 244–56.
241. See generally Chua, supra note 16. Professor Chua examined the privatization-
nationalization cycle in the developing countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia.
Like the strategies proposed in this Note, Professor Chua’s research suggests privatization
methods which encourage the consideration of the distributional consequences of privat-
ization.
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tween Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, Professor
Chua examines the tension between privatization and the ethnic,
nationalist structures that characterize most developing countries.
She concludes that a recurring oscillation exists between nation-
alizing and privatizing regimes throughout the developing areas of
Latin America and Southeast Asia.242 Drawing on a wide range
of historical and sociological data, Professor Chua makes a persua-
sive case that the cause of this cycle lies in the interplay between
privatization and ethnic group conflict. Free-market policies in
these regions historically have resulted in the disproportionate
prosperity of particular, ethnically identifiable groups. As a result,
ethnically charged—and therefore extremely potent—nationalist
movements repeatedly have arisen in the wake of privatization
programs.243
Attempts by foreigners to take control of newly privatized
nations, a practice similar to colonization, cause nationalist ideolo-
gies to arise and to disrupt privatization.244 The driving force of
a nationalist ideology is a sentiment not only against foreign inves-
tors, but also against “foreigners within,”245 i.e., different groups
who share the same country. In order to maintain a stable system,
measures must be undertaken to combat or curb these forces of
nationalism.246 These measures, in turn, must focus on the
distributional consequences of privatization.
This theory applies to Germany as well. While East Germans
and West Germans are not different ethnic groups under most
traditional analyses,247 they are two distinct groups who share the
same country. Different national identities in the two German
states developed over forty-five years.248 Life under a communist
system changed the East Germans. They lived under a different
set of laws, with a different social system, a pattern of political op-
pression, a struggling economy, and a low standard of living.249
242. See id. at 279–84.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 279.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 288.
247. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 51–52 (1985) (defin-
ing ethnicity as a “myth of collective ancestry,” based on birth and blood).
248. See LAURENCE H. MCFALLS, COMMUNISM’S COLLAPSE, DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE?
143 (1995).
249. See Landua, supra note 112, at 92, 97.
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Furthermore, East and West Germans think of themselves as dif-
ferent groups.250 The Ossis are the Germans from the East and
the Wessis are those from the West. The Ossis and Wessis hold
deep prejudices against each other.251 The Ossis “tend to see
westerners as exploiters, and [Wessis] . . . regard the east as an
unworthy sinkhole for their tax money.”252 Moreover, there are
significant psychological differences between the East and the
West.253
These differences have deepened since reunification.254 In a
survey of East and West Berlin bureaucrats, “nearly every third
respondent from East Berlin counted ‘citizens of the new Länder
as a distinct group of people whose legitimate interests were being
unduly neglected.”255 One commentator argues that the current
political problems in Germany have been caused by the “funda-
mental conflict between East and West Germans’ cultural val-
ues.”256 Because Germans view themselves as two distinct groups,
theories of privatization concerning group conflict in Southeast
Asia and Latin America are applicable.257
East Germans have witnessed Western prosperity and are
generally unsatisfied with their relative situation.258 As West Ger-
mans—“foreigners within”—and foreigners have bought much of
the land and enterprises in the East and unemployment has sky-
rocketed, feelings of animosity toward these investors have grown
and a certain East German “nationalism” has arisen. While privat-
ization in Germany is not in great danger of collapse, focus on the
group differences like those that were largely ignored in Latin
American and Southeast Asian privatizations would promote long-
term stability and integration. Today’s privatizers, including those
250. See Kuechler, supra note 19, at 47–49.
251. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 86–87.
252. Cowell, supra note 135, at A1.
253. See Baylis, supra note 12, at 86–87.
254. See, e.g., MCFALLS, supra note 248, at 152–54.
255. Eckhard Schröter, When Cultures Collide: The Case of Administrators from East
and West Berlin, in STUDIES IN GDR CULTURE AND SOCIETY 13.
256. MCFALLS, supra note 248, at 160.
257. The fact that East and West Germans view themselves as distinct groups also
exacerbates the distributional consequences of privatization. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SE-
CESSION 51 (1991) (arguing that whether a group regards itself as a victim of discrimina-
tory redistribution depends on how it regards its own identity in relation to other
groups).
258. See supra notes 116–27 and accompanying text.
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in Eastern Europe, should heed these warning signs and study
their predecessors’ experiences to prevent them from drifting into
a “privatization-nationalization cycle.”259
In order to combat the destructive forces of nationalism, Pro-
fessor Chua offers suggestions applicable in Germany and in other
parts of Eastern Europe. Her suggestions, if implemented, would
accomplish two things: they would give people a sense of owner-
ship in their country, as has voucher privatization in the Czech
context; and they would give critical attention to the distributional
consequences of privatization. First, Chua suggests ownership re-
strictions aimed at limiting the ownership interests of both foreign
investors and “foreigners within.”260 These restrictions run coun-
ter to the instincts of many of today’s commentators and privatiz-
ers because they necessarily inhibit foreign investment.261 Howev-
er, they could help to structure incoming foreign capital in a way
that allows citizens to retain some ownership, thus avoiding the
nationalist reaction that often arises from large shares of foreign
ownership.262 In Germany, this would have included measures for
East Germans to retain some ownership in their country to avoid
becoming an effective “colony” of the West.
Professor Chua also suggests government subsidies for small,
local investors.263 She compares this method to voucher privatiza-
tion and concludes that it will have an effect similar to that of
ownership restrictions, maintaining a stake for citizens of the pri-
vatizing country instead of parsing it out to foreigners.264 Subsi-
dies would likely have proven valuable in East Germany. If the
Treuhand had expended some of the money it spent on the search
for foreign investors on subsidies for entities that could have been
purchased and managed by East Germans, integration of East
Germans into the nascent economy would have been facilitated
and the colonization effect could have been avoided. Similarly,
Chua suggests allowing labor to become involved in the privatiza-
259. Chua, supra note 16, at 226.
260. Chua, supra note 16, at 289–96.
261. Cf. Ulrich Hiemenz, Comment on Andr´as Inotai, Experience with Privatization in
East Central Europe in PRIVATIZATION, supra note 197, at 183, 184; Schmiedling, supra
note 197, at 107.
262. See Chua, supra note 16, at 289.
263. See id. at 293.
264. See id.
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tion process.265 Provisions for employee buyouts or for allocation
of shares to employees of a privatizing enterprise are manners of
implementing such a scheme.266 Finally, Professor Chua suggests
requirements that foreign investors bring prompt tangible benefits
to the local community, perhaps mandated in purchase agreements
or other contractual obligations.267 Although these measures may
lead to less short-term economic efficiency, more stable private
regimes will result in the long run.268 Ignoring suggestions like
these in the past has led to, and most likely will again lead to, a
return to nationalization.
The same forces lead to political instability. Unless kept in
check, group tensions have the potential to undo all the good that
has been accomplished through privatization. While transferring
enterprises to private hands is the goal of privatization, a stable
regime is a prerequisite. Ignoring the distributional consequences
of privatization and exacerbating group conflict will likely cause
instability. The seeds of this phenomenon are exhibited in Ger-
many, a stable, western country. The countries of the developing
world and the former Soviet bloc would do well to heed these
warning signs.
CONCLUSION
German privatization was a mammoth task that has been, by
traditional measures, quite successful. There are several areas,
however, in which the legal structures chosen by the German
privatizers have created problems for the German people. East
German integration into a unified German economic, political and
social life has been inhibited as a result of the colonial mentality
caused by these structures. This Note has pointed out deficiencies
in the German system and their effects on the East German peo-
ple.
It is too late for Germany to employ alternative mechanisms,
but today’s privatizers can learn a great deal from the decisions of
265. See id. at 298.
266. See id. at 297–98.
267. See id. at 296.
268. See id. at 296–97 (recommending the wide, quick and visible distribution of the
benefits of privatization on the general populace over the “spectacle of a privatized com-
pany” reaping profits for foreigners and a few wealthy domestic elite); see also Jeffrey
Prescott, Book Note, Government Efficiency and the Market Metaphor, 105 YALE L.J.
2019, 2024 (1996).
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the privatizers who have engaged in the world’s largest such ven-
ture. While no two countries face identical circumstances, the same
principal task must be accomplished in privatization: the transfer
of state-owned property to the private sector. Because this basic
task is the same, comparative examples are a valuable tool to
improve techniques for today’s privatizers. This Note has focused
on two comparative illustrations, but countless others are useful as
well.
The German, Czech, Latin American, and Southeast Asian
examples suggest mechanisms to foster long-term stability of a
market system and integration of the people. Each country must
tailor specific methods to fit its needs, but today’s privatizers
should give central attention to the distributional consequences of
privatization. This can be accomplished by involving all groups of
citizens in the privatization process. Involving these citizens in the
privatization process creates a national stake in the new economy,
enhances the strength of the newly-instituted economic regime, and
fosters stability in a government supported by its citizens.
